A fee charged by a broker or agent for his/her service in facilitating a transaction, such as the buying or selling of securities or real estate. In the case of securities trading, brokers can be split into two broad categories depending on the sales charges they charge. Discount brokers charge relatively low sales charges, but provide no services beyond executing trades. Full service brokers charge higher sales charges, but provide research and investment advisory services. also called commission.
Monday, June 27, 2011
Saturday, June 4, 2011
European Depository Receipt
A negotiable certificate held in the bank of one country representing a specific number of shares of a stock traded on an exchange of another country. American Depositary Receipts make it easier for individuals to invest in foreign companies, due to the widespread availability of price information, lower transaction costs, and timely dividend distributions. also called European Depositary Receipt. also called Global Depositary Receipt (GDR).
Thursday, June 2, 2011
Average Strike Option
A type of stock option used on Asian exchanges. The strike price in this type of option is based on the average asset price during a certain period of time, defined by a range of dates called the "fixings." This type of option is less volatile than traditional options, which have a predetermined strike price.
Crossing
A situation in which a broker acts as agent on both sides of a given transaction. If the broker has a buy order and an equivalent sell order, he/she can "cross" the orders. This is common in the case of large orders, but is legal only if the broker first offers the securities to the public at a price higher than the bid price.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
How can black money be brought back to India?
The globalisation and liberalisation of economic activity has resulted in an escalating growth in transnational business, thereby transforming the world to one without borders. Such inclusion, coupled with the complexities of financial systems around the world, has deprived governments of their share of revenues.
Tax havens are a reality of today’s globalised economic landscape. While on one hand they promote tax competition, on the other, if abused and opaquely regulated, tax havens can cost exchequers of various countries vast sums of money, forcing governments to keep tax rates high.
The global milieu has turned resolutely against opaque banking secrecy norms. The first of such strides can be in the form of new money laundering laws in US (back in 2001) requiring sharing of information between financial institutions and enforcement agencies, which was also followed by other countries, wherein the focal point remained tracking terror funding and not tax evasion.
Further, the G20 in April 2009 also pressed for counter-measures against tax havens and non-cooperative financial centres that had agreed to internationally-accepted tax standards on sharing tax information, but had not substantially implemented them. At the G20 meet in Seoul last year, the use of initiatives and statistics on subsequent significant increases in revenues from tax evaders across the globe was put forward, thereby re-emphasising the process of exchange of information.
In wake of such losses to the government exchequer due to tax evasion and money laundering and the need of increased government spending due to the global economic crisis hurting India as well, a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Centre to bring back crores of rupees illegally squirreled away in secret foreign bank accounts by tax evaders and hawala dealers was recently preferred by a group of eminent personalities.
The executive has sought ‘confidentiality’ as an argument to not make publicly available the information received about Indian account-holders from foreign banks. Also, the recent news of bankers’ involvement in a conspiracy to hide accounts in India has again brought the issue of black money to the forefront.
So, is there an instant solution to bring back the black money sheltered in tax havens or can it only be a gradual process? The immediate step here seems to be introduction of an amnesty scheme for voluntary disclosure, both outside and inside the country, so that parallel flow of black money in the Indian economy is eliminated.
At this stage, what becomes necessary is transparency of the tax system and an emergent need for exchange of information that has been acknowledged by leaders the world over.
The importance of information exchange, though slightly late, has been realised by our government. Cross-border economic offences can now be brought under the scanner, because the information available will definitely open more evidentiary and procedural doors, which were shut before the framework of exchange of information agreements. Other bilateral agreements with tax havens or banking havens and changes to the existing exchange of information mechanisms embedded in the double taxation avoidance agreements might prove beneficial in future, but one must wait and see how these existing agreements are enforced and how the newly-cropped path of exchange of information is treaded along.
However, the lean response from various countries to the request of enforcement directorate (ED) — the agency investigating money laundering and violation of foreign exchange norms in spectrum allocation in the most celebrated case pending before the Supreme Court on second-generation telecom licences — can be a major setback to the process of initiating exchange of information in order to ensure that the proceeds of black money are routed back to India through these companies based abroad.
Another significant step has been the strengthening of the administrative machinery by seeking to set up eight more overseas income-tax units by the Central Board of Direct Taxes , an apex administrative body. Two such units are already functional, one each in Singapore and Mauritius.
Further, with the recent amendment to the money laundering law in India widening the horizon available to the investigating officer and new set of legislative framework for tax in terms of the Direct Taxes Code incorporating provisions for checking illicit outflow of funds expected to be effective from April 1, 2012, the black money story should be in check.
Tax havens are a reality of today’s globalised economic landscape. While on one hand they promote tax competition, on the other, if abused and opaquely regulated, tax havens can cost exchequers of various countries vast sums of money, forcing governments to keep tax rates high.
The global milieu has turned resolutely against opaque banking secrecy norms. The first of such strides can be in the form of new money laundering laws in US (back in 2001) requiring sharing of information between financial institutions and enforcement agencies, which was also followed by other countries, wherein the focal point remained tracking terror funding and not tax evasion.
Further, the G20 in April 2009 also pressed for counter-measures against tax havens and non-cooperative financial centres that had agreed to internationally-accepted tax standards on sharing tax information, but had not substantially implemented them. At the G20 meet in Seoul last year, the use of initiatives and statistics on subsequent significant increases in revenues from tax evaders across the globe was put forward, thereby re-emphasising the process of exchange of information.
In wake of such losses to the government exchequer due to tax evasion and money laundering and the need of increased government spending due to the global economic crisis hurting India as well, a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Centre to bring back crores of rupees illegally squirreled away in secret foreign bank accounts by tax evaders and hawala dealers was recently preferred by a group of eminent personalities.
The executive has sought ‘confidentiality’ as an argument to not make publicly available the information received about Indian account-holders from foreign banks. Also, the recent news of bankers’ involvement in a conspiracy to hide accounts in India has again brought the issue of black money to the forefront.
So, is there an instant solution to bring back the black money sheltered in tax havens or can it only be a gradual process? The immediate step here seems to be introduction of an amnesty scheme for voluntary disclosure, both outside and inside the country, so that parallel flow of black money in the Indian economy is eliminated.
At this stage, what becomes necessary is transparency of the tax system and an emergent need for exchange of information that has been acknowledged by leaders the world over.
The importance of information exchange, though slightly late, has been realised by our government. Cross-border economic offences can now be brought under the scanner, because the information available will definitely open more evidentiary and procedural doors, which were shut before the framework of exchange of information agreements. Other bilateral agreements with tax havens or banking havens and changes to the existing exchange of information mechanisms embedded in the double taxation avoidance agreements might prove beneficial in future, but one must wait and see how these existing agreements are enforced and how the newly-cropped path of exchange of information is treaded along.
However, the lean response from various countries to the request of enforcement directorate (ED) — the agency investigating money laundering and violation of foreign exchange norms in spectrum allocation in the most celebrated case pending before the Supreme Court on second-generation telecom licences — can be a major setback to the process of initiating exchange of information in order to ensure that the proceeds of black money are routed back to India through these companies based abroad.
Another significant step has been the strengthening of the administrative machinery by seeking to set up eight more overseas income-tax units by the Central Board of Direct Taxes , an apex administrative body. Two such units are already functional, one each in Singapore and Mauritius.
Further, with the recent amendment to the money laundering law in India widening the horizon available to the investigating officer and new set of legislative framework for tax in terms of the Direct Taxes Code incorporating provisions for checking illicit outflow of funds expected to be effective from April 1, 2012, the black money story should be in check.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
Airtel vs Videocon vs Vodafone – Logo Comparison
Airtel logo that was launched as a mark of Airtel’s 200million customer milestone, hasn’t worked out that well and isn’t up to the mark. There’s a lot of conversation on the internet regarding the new logo. A lot many said that the logo is quite similar to Videocon’s logo and it’s a n inverted version of it. I feel the same. Few said that the logo resembles Vodafone logo. Here’s a comparison on all the 3 logos.Clearly, the Airtel logo does resemble the Videocon logo. It’s quite astonishing that Airtel, the Indian telecomm giant has failed in designing the logo in a designer’s perspective. They should have taken suggestions and feedbacks before launching it or maybe could have come up with a different design altogether.
Friday, December 3, 2010
How Tata Nano hit a big bump in India...
The Tata Nano was a small car that was expected to deliver big numbers, the new plant at Sanand in Gujarat was built to produce 2.5 lakh units a year, eventually ramping up to 5 lakh units. But 15 months after a high-profile launch, it has encountered trouble at every turn — three instances of the car going up in flames and a few cases of smoke emanating from it (the last was in September), confusion about its positioning, a rather unexpected bunch of affluent initial buyers, poor distribution reach, and financing bottlenecks. Nano’s sales have dipped from 9,000 units in July to 3,000 in October to just a little over 500 in November. The number of workers there has decreased by 80% in the last month.
Many dealers say they have not picked up any fresh stock during the last two months as they were trying to sell existing cars. Dealer inventories at the beginning of November are estimated to be 17,000-20 ,000 units, according to officials at Nano’s dealers and suppliers. The company says that inventory levels are not so high, though it declined to disclose numbers.
“I am a little surprised by the Nano’s sales figures,” says the head of a rival car manufacturer speaking on the condition of anonymity . “The car was positioned as an alternative to two-wheelers , but that’s not happening. Those looking to upgrade from two-wheelers are put off by the negative publicity (over the fires) and safety issues and buyers of the top-end Nano will rather put in a few thousand more and buy another car like the Alto,” he adds.
Maruti Alto has sold 3.93 lakh units, while over 71,000 Nanos have been sold since the latter was launched last July. The base version of Alto carries a price tag of Rs 2.54 lakh, compared to the Nano’s Rs 1.45 lakh (on-road in Delhi).
“The Nano was to sell on ‘demand pull’ , but now it’s plagued with poor image and quality issues ,” says a top-ranking executive who has worked with a car company in the past. “The Nano was supposed to attract maximum footfalls to dealerships and have a rub-off effect on its other models. But it hasn’t .”
Is the small car hurtling into a big crisis? And what is the company doing to fix it? It’s easy to attribute the deteriorating sales of the Nano to the incidents of the fire. (More on that later.) But there is perhaps also a deeper marketing failure that’s lurking behind the smoke.
Many dealers say they have not picked up any fresh stock during the last two months as they were trying to sell existing cars. Dealer inventories at the beginning of November are estimated to be 17,000-20 ,000 units, according to officials at Nano’s dealers and suppliers. The company says that inventory levels are not so high, though it declined to disclose numbers.
“I am a little surprised by the Nano’s sales figures,” says the head of a rival car manufacturer speaking on the condition of anonymity . “The car was positioned as an alternative to two-wheelers , but that’s not happening. Those looking to upgrade from two-wheelers are put off by the negative publicity (over the fires) and safety issues and buyers of the top-end Nano will rather put in a few thousand more and buy another car like the Alto,” he adds.
Maruti Alto has sold 3.93 lakh units, while over 71,000 Nanos have been sold since the latter was launched last July. The base version of Alto carries a price tag of Rs 2.54 lakh, compared to the Nano’s Rs 1.45 lakh (on-road in Delhi).
“The Nano was to sell on ‘demand pull’ , but now it’s plagued with poor image and quality issues ,” says a top-ranking executive who has worked with a car company in the past. “The Nano was supposed to attract maximum footfalls to dealerships and have a rub-off effect on its other models. But it hasn’t .”
Is the small car hurtling into a big crisis? And what is the company doing to fix it? It’s easy to attribute the deteriorating sales of the Nano to the incidents of the fire. (More on that later.) But there is perhaps also a deeper marketing failure that’s lurking behind the smoke.
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